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THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN
AND
THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

BY
MILES CLAYTON HUYETTE

1915
BUFFALO, N. Y.

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INTRODUCTORY

TO those who shall read "The Maryland Campaign and The Battle of Antietam—" who served in that Campaign—will come memory-pictures of soldier boys grouped about smoky green-wood fires in bivouac—at night —after the fatigueing march of the day; some groups singing patriotic and home songs—not forgetting "The Girl I Left Behind Me"; another group a prayer-meeting; here and there—by fitful lights—some playing cards, others cooking and eating, and other shadowy forms silhouetted against the yellow-red light of camp fires re-reading letters from loved ones at home.

Other than the general history compilation—necessary for the development of subject matter—it will be personal experience descriptive of soldier-life and battle.

The illustrations showing war-time views are from "Harper's Weekly" and the "Brady" series; other views from photographs made by M. C. Huyette in September, 1914.

The *total Union enlistment* in the war was 2,778,314; 564,949 were *"re-enlisted."* The estimated *number of individuals* in the United States army and navy during the war was 2,213,365—of these

682,117 were 21 years old and over.
1,159,789 were 21 years and under.
844,881 were 17 years and under.
231,051 were 16 years and under.
104,987 were 15 years and under.
1,523 were 14 years and under.
300 were 13 years and under.
278 were 12 years and under.

Only ONE of that 2,213,365 is in active service; "Johnnie Clem" was 11 years and 11 months old when he enlisted. For bravery in battle he was commissioned Sergeant—on field of battle; is now "Colonel John M. Clem" in active service in the Quartermaster's Department, Washington, D. C.—and will be retired this year—1915.

Visiting leading points of interest, after an interval of fifty-two years for some of them and twenty-four years for others, brings to memory living-moving-pictures at the different places; tentless boys of the Army of the Potomac in brush canopies in Pleasant Valley, and shelterless on the north face of Maryland Heights—up near the big siege guns —where we drove stakes in the ground and placed logs above them so that we would not slide down hill when sleeping, and would wake nights sitting against the up-hill side of the logs with legs hanging over; we were "A-seein' things at night," and when we waked were "A-feelin' needles in our legs."

The picture moves! We see the boys in brush canopies on a bench of the mountain—to the right and a little lower down—fighting mosquitoes, wood-ticks, devils-darn-needles, and grey-backs we captured (or they captured us) at Frederick, South Mountain and Antietam. When the cold October rains came how the roofs leaked.

(In those days, pro-slavery orators preached from the text "All men were born free and equal." The grey-backs practiced that they preached; to the grey-backs we were "All free and equal"—equally good meat).



"Madam Dumfries' shower baths free,
Was war-time hos-pi-tal-i-ty,
On beds of mud knee-deep we trod,
And pillowed our heads on rain-soaked sod."

PULLING DUMFRIES MUD WITH BOTH FEET—WITH A COLD SHOWER BATH FREE.

The picture moves! We see the same boys in dog tents and later in log huts in Loudoun Valley; at times lying on their bellies in the frosty grass and weeds on a thin picket line stretching across the valley; at other times crouching behind rocks for shelter from piercing wintry winds and snow flurries —when on picket duty on the bald north face of Loudoun Heights.

We see the bivouac at Goose Creek—where we were all buried under six inches of snow, and hear the beat of drums and the shrill of fifes and bugles—the reveille at break of day. Stiff and sore, racked with pains and aches, coughing and limping, the men get out of snowy beds; the scenery as of a crowded graveyard—numberless white mounds stretching irregularly in the gloomy feeble light. Without fires, and shivering with cold, the men eat some fat cold sow-belly and a few hard-tack and drink water from canteens; the command is given, "Fall in! Fall in!" All the day tramping in slush of sleet, snow and mud, on Leesburg Turnpike, and in the afternoon "pulling Dumfries mud with both feet—with a cold shower bath free"—in our effort to reach Fredericksburg in time for the battle. At night we bivouacked in fields and open woods. We cut small limbs from pine trees and made beds of them—so we would not sink in the mud whilst sleeping; placed wet leaves on the brush, then a poncho and over that a blanket; soaked to the skin—and with sodden feet—we lay down with haversack for pillow, and with top cover of one blanket and poncho over that we slept the sleep of dead-tired men.

The picture moves backward! We see the comfortable hut life in the jack-pines at Fairfax Station.

The picture moves! We see the cold, dreary, filthy, cheerless, comfortless, and almost hopeless hut life at Stafford Court House—with the many times a day three volleys, as the form of somebody's loved one was buried—in the mud.

Later, that grand old fighting machine, the Army of the Potomac, under Burnside, "stuck in the mud"—the roads impassable, not even jackassable—in our first attempt on Chancellorsville.

When we fought battles the physical and mental strain was terrific. We did more actual labor every day—carrying rifle equipment, ammunition, food, water, clothing, blankets, etc., than those who remained at home did in a month, and all that for 43 cents a day—$13.00 a month—and on a diet the average tramp of today would spurn.

Comrades who had like experiences will know if or not the word-picture is true.

M. C. HUYETTE.

Buffalo, N. Y., July, 1915.

Co. B 125th P. V. 12th Corps 1862-3,
Co. B. 208th P. V. 18th Corps 1864 and
9th Corps late 1864-5.

CHRONOLOGICAL

The series of battles on the Peninsula—in front of Richmond—and the battles at Mechanicsville, Fair Oaks, Savage Station, Glendale, Gaines' Mills and Malvern Hill, "The seven days' battle"—beginning June 25th, 1862, made a "change of base" necessary for the Army of the Potomac. Lee had outgeneraled McClellan and knowing his opponent, divided his force—in face of the enemy—and started the larger part of his army for the Potomac for the purpose of forcing McClellan to withdraw from the Richmond front.

Jackson—with his "foot cavalry"—had been sent to the Rapidan and by a two-day march attacked the Union troops under Banks near Cedar Mountain—this on August 9th.

August 16th the evacuation of Harrison's Landing was completed by McClellan's army—his retreat having been concealed by strategy. "Little Mc" was a competent engineer and *always ready* to retreat. August 22nd the Army of the Potomac arrived at Alexandria.

The main body of troops for the defense of Washington was under the command of General Pope—he of "headquarters in the saddle" fame—and was then on the line of the Rappahannock River. On August 23rd artillery firing induced Pope to fall back.

Lee again divided his force; Ewell was detached and passing to the right of Pope marched up the Valley and with his 10,000 troops marched through a pass of the Blue Ridge, drove in the Union pickets at Manassas Junction, overpowered the

force at Bull Run Bridge and pushed on toward Alexandria. Pope marched northward from Warrenton Junction, and his forces—which had been joined by Hooker's division—encountered Ewell at Kettle Run.

August 29th the battle of Groveton was fought; the engagement became general about 6:30 a. m., and before noon the Union position became critical; the commands of Kearney and Reno arrived, and in the afternoon the force of Hooker arrived; at 6:00 p. m., the victory was with the Union troops.

August 30th the second battle of Bull Run; with "the Johnnies" it was the place where "the Yankees Run." The troops of Heintzleman, Porter, McDowell and Banks—under Pope—were engaged with the whole rebel army under Lee and were defeated with a loss of 800 killed, 4,000 wounded and 2,000 prisoners. The Union Army again retreated.

General Lee sent Stonewall Jackson to the Little River Turnpike—to turn the right flank of the Federal Army—and this brought on the battle of Chantilly, September 1st; the fighting was fierce, continued until after dark—in a severe storm of thunder, lightning and rain. Generals Kearney and Stevens were killed.

September 3rd all the troops of the Army of Virginia were brought within McClellan's lines—for "the defense of Washington."

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

AS a result of the battle of Bull Run—second battle—August 30th, and the disastrous battle of Chantilly, September 1st, the Army of Virginia was forced to retreat within the lines for the defense of Washington—covering a period of two days, September 2nd and 3rd, and was merged into the Army of the Potomac. General Pope had been removed and General McClellan again in full command.

General Lee, ever prompt in action, believed that the hour had come for final success of the Southern Confederacy; believed that if he could keep the Union Army beaten—and win a decisive battle on Northern soil—would so influence the approaching elections in the North as to compel the United States Government to accept a proposal for peace, on the basis of the independence of the insurgent States. To secure supplies—live off the enemy—by moving through a rich section of the country which had not been devastated by the men of both armies, and if possible secure recruits, were possibilities and necessities such as that the only wise plan for Lee was the invasion of Maryland.

The Northward movement of General Lee's troops—approximately 60,000 fighting men—started September 4th, crossing the Potomac River near Poolesville, Maryland. The Confederate "Army of Northern Virginia"—so-called—was overjoyed at its many successes and the prospect of foraging at will on the enemy, and believed itself invincible; to the rank

and file it meant shoes, clothing, plenty of food, destruction of property of enemies, and, above all, victory to be won from the enemy; their song—almost constant—was "Maryland, My Maryland," which at that time was the favorite song in the South. After September 17th they sang a different song—it was "I Wish I Was In Dixie"—"Dixie-land! Dixie-land!"

Lack of unity of plan and action, lack of co-operation at critical times in battle, jealousy on the part of commanding officers, and bad generalship, made the Maryland Campaign possible for General Lee.

The daily papers in the North printed the news of the battles fully and almost daily had columns of lists of the killed, wounded and missing; despondency and gloom—with almost panic in Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania—prevailed throughout the Northern States. The Army of the Potomac, though defeated time and time again, was not dismayed; we had lost confidence in many commanding officers but this was more than compensated for by gain in confidence by the fighting units—the men behind the guns—whose courage and endurance had been tested by sunshine and storm, fatigue of march, at times lack of food and sleep, water unfit for man or beast to drink, and had been tried-out in the fierce fires of battle.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. MC CLELLAN
COMMANDING THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

LT.-GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE
COMMANDING THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

The Army of the Potomac was on the march or in bivouac September 4-14, as shown by the following table:

Command.	September 4.	September 6.	September 9.	September 10.
BURNSIDE.				
9th Corps, Reno	Seventh street road	Leesborough	Brookville	
1st Corps, Hooker	Upton's Hill	do	do	
SUMNER.				
12th Corps, Williams	Tennallytown	Rockville	Middlebrook	Damascus.
2d Corps, Sumner	do	do	do	Clarksburg.
FRANKLIN.				
6th Corps, Franklin	Alexandria Seminary	Tennallytown	Darnestown	Barnesville.
Couch's division	Tennallytown	Offutt's Cross-Roads	Mouth of Seneca	Poolesville.
Sykes' division		Tennallytown	Rockville	Rockville.

Command.	September 11.	September 12.	September 13.	September 14.
BURNSIDE.				
9th Corps, Reno	New Market	Frederick	Middletown	South Mountain.
1st Corps, Hooker		Ridgeville, Newmarket, and on the Monocacy.	Frederick	Do.
SUMNER.				
12th Corps, Williams	Damascus	Ijamsville Cross-Roads	do	Do.
2d Corps, Sumner	Clarksburg	Urbana	do	Do.
FRANKLIN.				
6th Corps, Franklin	Barnesville	Licksville Cross-Road.	Buckeystown	Burkittsville.
Couch's division	Poolesville	Barnesville	Licksville	Do.
Sykes' division	Middlebrook	Urbana	Frederick	Middletown.

September 7th, McClellan took the field at the head of the reorganized Army of the Potomac.

September 6th the brigade of which my regiment (the 125th P. V. Infantry) formed a part started, after dark, from Fort Barnard, north of Alexandria Seminary—on the Virginia side; we crossed the Potomac at Georgetown and were then in the rush of the Maryland Campaign. "Three days' rations, 40 rounds of ammunition and no baggage." Most men had poncho and blanket or overcoat.

We marched all the night of the 6th and bivouacked in the fair ground at Rockville—14 miles from Washington—September 7th.

(On that night march I had a package of smoking tobacco and an envelope enclosing some tea—sent by Mother—in the one pocket of my blouse; the haversack strap "busted" the paper wrappings; when we bivouacked I made tea; the tea all looked alike, but was undrinkable. That was my first experience in individual cooking—but was not my last effort.)

We had been assigned to the First Brigade, First Division 12th Corps—commanded by Major General Joseph K. F. Mansfield; the Division was commanded by Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams; the Brigade *organization was composed as follows:

Brigadier General Samuel W. Crawford, Commanding.

5th Connecticut.....Capt. Henry W. Daboll
10th Maine.....Col. George L. Beal
28th New York.....Capt. William H. Mapes
46th Pennsylvania.....Col. Joseph F. Knipe
124th Pennsylvania.....Col. Joseph W. Hawley
125th Pennsylvania*.....Col. Jacob Higgins
128th Pennsylvania.....Col. Samuel Crossdale

*The organizations given so that the reader may follow the personal description of events to follow.

Our itinerary from Rockville to Frederick City was—September 9th to Middleville and bivouacked; September 10th via Goshen to Damascus; September 11th remained in bivouac; September 12th, moved via Urbana to near Ijamsville and bivouacked; September 13th, moved to near Frederick City and bivouacked between the Monocasy River and the town. On the marches—other than the night march Georgetown to Rockville—artillery and ammunition trains occupied the roads and the infantry marched in columns of fours, both sides, through orchards and fields of corn, tobacco, sweet potatoes, etc. Strict orders prohibitive of foraging were issued—as we were marching through Northern territory, and whilst many of the inhabitants were slave owners, and in sympathy with the Southern cause, the Washington Administration made strong effort to protect Unionists and rebel sympathizers alike—and thus minimize the effect of the occupation of the territory by the rebel army. Present "Necessity knows no law"; the necessities of the Confederates such as that they did not discriminate in appropriating properties for their then present or future use—and make good their daily losses in animals used for transportation purposes. The destruction of growing crops and fences and losses of movable property such as that the Confederates were not received with "open arms"—as they had expected.

Notwithstanding the orders prohibitive of foraging, we, of the Northern Army, foraged for poultry, raided spring houses for milk and butter—but in most instances paid cash for that obtained; occasionally a sheep or a porker would die suddenly; we raised sweet potatoes—from the ground, plucked roasting ears as we marched through the cornfields and gathered apples as we passed through the many orchards. One

day the regiment—125th P. V.—was "left in line" of the brigade and my company was "left company"; following was the Third Brigade and at its head Brigadier General Gordon and his staff. A soldier had killed a porker and not having time to skin it had cut off a hind quarter and was carrying it on his back suspended from musket barrel; the man was tramping in rear of Co. B. and directly in front of General Gordon—who gave him a sharp order, "Close up! Join your company"! the soldier looked over his shoulder but did not quicken his pace; in a short time the order was repeated and "I am General Gordon." The man saluted and replied, "I am happy to make your acquaintance!"—and the staff roared with laughter.

Boys from the country like milk; it was an ordinary occurrence for them to "hold up cows"; one would hold by a horn and the nose and men would be milking at both sides at the same time—was a new experience for the cows.

When General Lee again divided his forces, September 4th —in front of Washington, he was confronting the combined Union forces of the "Army of Northern Virginia" and the "Army of the Potomac"; at that time Colonel D. S. Miles was in command at the fortified post "Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry"; the command was not a unit of the reorganized Army of the Potomac; was under the direct orders of the War Department in Washington. Miles had a force of 13,000 at first, but he sent away 1,500 cavalry. Boliver Heights—on the Virginia side—a commanding position and well fortified from the Potomac to the Shenandoah River; Maryland Heights—on the Maryland side—a more command-

FEDERAL TROOPS FORAGING.

ing position and overlooking Boliver Heights was fairly well fortified; these conditions were such as that a courageous competent commander should have maintained position against an attacking force of 40,000 men.

September 10th Lee again divided his force; Jackson with his foot cavalry'' started on a forced march via Boonsboro-Williamsport-Martinsburg—for Harper's Ferry for the purpose of its capture. Miles' command was cut off and communication with Washington possible only by signal stations —using signal flags in day time and by waving lights at night. At the time the Confederate Army crossed into Maryland the men were ragged, dirty, and many without shoes, but their condition changed quickly. Major Williams—5th Va. Infty., made record—''Our short sojourn in the Land of Promise wrought a salutary change in the general appearance and condition of the troops. The ragged were clad, the shoeless shod, and the inner man rejoiced by a number and variety of delicacies to which it had been a stranger for long, long, weary months before.''

General Jackson marched rapidly, crossed the Potomac September 11th, at Williamsport, sent A. P. Hills' division directly to Martinsburg and disposed the rest of his command to cut off the retreat of the Federals westward. General D. H. Hill's division was then halting near Boonsboro to prevent a retreat of Miles' command through Pleasant Valley. Brigadier General Julius White in command at Martinsburg, retreated to Harper's Ferry, and Jackson entered September 12th, capturing some prisoners and abandoned stores.

September 12th, General Jackson had directed General Kershaw, with his own and Barksdale's brigade, to ascend the ridge, whose southern extremity is known as "Maryland Heights," and attack that part of General Miles' troops who occupied that fortified position. He disposed of the rest of his command to hold the roads leading from Harper's Ferry eastward through Weverton and northward from Sandy Hook, and guarding the pass in his rear—through which he had entered Pleasant Valley. Owing to the rugged nature of the ground Kershaw could not use artillery. Driving in the advanced line on the summit of the ridge on the 12th he assailed the main works on the 13th and after a spirited contest they were carried; the Federal troops spiking their heavy guns and retreating to Harper's Ferry. At 4:30 P. M., Kershaw was in full possession of Maryland Heights.

The forenoon of September 13th the leading division, under General A. P. Hill, came in sight of the fortifications on Bolivar Heights—in rear of Harper's Ferry.

Before beginning the attack General Jackson put himself in communication with his co-operating forces under Generals McLaws and Walker, from the former of whom he was separated by the Potomac and from the latter by the Shenandoah. General Walker took possession of Loudoun Heights—which overlooked Harper's Ferry and Bolivar Heights—from which a plunging fire, at short range, could be delivered in rear of the line of the Federal force. That commanding position was occupied without opposition.

On the 13th, General Hill sent back the brigades of Garland and Colquit to hold the pass at Crampton Gap, but subsequently ascertaining that the Federals were near by in full force he ordered up the rest of his division. Longstreet was ordered to march from Hagerstown to his support.

The afternoon of September 13th, we—of First Division, 12th Corps—crossed the Monocasy River and bivouacked in a stubble-field south of the Baltimore Pike, about half distance from the river and Frederick City. There the now famous "Lost Order" of Lee was found; it revealed the plan of Lee to McClellan. The Army of the Potomac was immediately put in motion—with Hagerstown the objective point.

On the night of September 13th the positions of the different Corps were as follows:

Reno's Corps, Middletown, except Rodman's division at Frederick.

Hooker's Corps on the Monocasy, two miles from Frederick.

Sumner's Corps near Frederick.

Banks' Corps near Frederick.

Sykes' Division near Frederick.

Franklin's Corps at Buckeyetown.

Couch's Division at Licksville.

The orders from headquarters for the march on the 14th were as follows:

13th—6:45 P. M. Couch to move to Jefferson with his whole division.

8:45 P. M. Sumner to move at 7:00 A. M.

11:30 P. M. Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown.

11:30 P. M. Sykes to move at 6:00 A. M., 14th, after Hooker—on the Middletown and Hagerstown road.

14th—1:00 A. M. Artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely.

9:00 A. M. Sumner ordered to take the Shookstown road to Middletown.

General Pleasonton, with his cavalry, was reconnoitering on the front on the 13th; he continued his reconnoissance the morning of the 14th. Gibson's battery and afterwards Benjamin's battery—of Reno's Corps—were placed on high ground to the left of the turnpike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position.

On the 14th, a road for artillery was cut along the ridge—on Maryland Heights, and at 2:00 P. M., four Confederate guns opened fire on the entrenched Federal line of works on Boliver Heights—taking them in flank and rear.

Early on the 14th the advance of McClellan's army attempted to force its way to the rear of the position held by D. H. Hill by a road south of Boonsboro and Frederick City Turnpike; the first attack was repulsed temporarily; the remainder of Colquit's brigade arrived shortly afterwards and was disposed across the turnpike road; that of G. B. Anderson, supported by Ripley, was placed on the right, and Rodes' occupied an important position on the left. Garland's brigade which had suffered heavily in the first attack, was withdrawn,

and the defense of the road occupied by it intrusted to Colonel Rosser—of the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, who reported to General Hill with his regment and some artillery. The small command of General D. H. Hill repelled the repeated assaults of the Federal Army and held it in check for five hours. Several attacks on the center were repulsed by Colquit's brigade, and Rodes maintained his position against heavy odds with the utmost tenacity. Longstreet, leaving one brigade at Hagerstown, had hurried to the assistance of D. H. Hill.

On the afternoon of the 14th—when Jackson learned that the troops of Walker and McLaws were in position to co-operate in the attack, he ordered General A. P. Hill to turn the Federal left flank and enter Harper's Ferry. Ewell's division (under General Lawton) was ordered to support Hill, while Winder's brigade—of Jackson's division under Col. Grigsby, with a battery of artillery—made a demonstration to the Federal's right near the Potomac. The cavalry under Major Massie was placed on the extreme left to prevent escape. Colonel Grigsby succeeded in getting possession of an eminence on the left upon which two batteries were advantageously posted. General A. P. Hill, observing a hill on the Federal extreme left occupied by infantry without artillery and protected only by abatis of felled timber, directed General Pender with his own brigade and those of General Archer and Colonel Brockenbrough to seize the crest, which was done with slight resistance. At the same time he ordered Generals Branch and Gregg to march along the Shenandoah, and, taking advantage of the ravines intersecting its steep banks, to establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the

Federal works; this was accomplished during the night. Lieutenant Colonel Walker, chief of artillery of Hill's Division, placed several batteries on the eminence taken by General Pender, and, under the directions of Colonel Crutchfield, General Jackson's chief of artillery, ten guns belonging to Ewell's division were posted on the east side of the Shenandoah, so as to enfilade the Federal entrenchments on Boliver Heights and take the nearest and most formidable works in reverse.

The attack on the garrison began at dawn, September 15th. A rapid and vigorous fire was opened from the batteries of General Jackson and those on the Maryland and Loudoun Heights. General Miles was killed, and in about two hours the garrison, consisting of more than 11,000 men, surrendered, with 73 pieces of artillery, about 13,000 small arms and a large quantity of military stores.

Leaving General A. P. Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and secure the captured property, General Jackson, with his two other divisions, set out at once for Sharpsburg, ordering Generals McLaws and Walker to follow without delay.

The early afternoon of September 14th the 12th Corps marched through Frederick City. Comrades who participated in the forced march of that day will remember the heavy burden carried; the cutting torture of canteen, haversack and cartridge-box straps on shoulder muscles; the stifling clouds of dust—ground to impalpable powder by thousands of wheels of artillery and ammunition trains, hoof-beats of horses and mules and tramping of men; the intense heat of the sun;

GEN. MC CLELLAN PASSING THROUGH FREDERICK CITY, SEPT., 1862.

lack of water; the oft-repeated command, "Close-up, men! Close-up!" and the booming of cannon—in the distance—as foot-sore and weary we toiled up Elk Mountain hurrying to the battlefield of South Mountain. When we reached the summit—where we could look down and across Middletown Valley—through the shimmering heat waves we could see lines of infantry—which looked like ribbons of blue—being rushed to the front; the rays of the sun glinted from musket barrel and bayonet and polished brass cannon; batteries in position—in the fields in the valley—firing over the heads of the advancing line of battle; smoke of shells bursting in air at Crampton and Turner's Gaps, and could see lines of smoke in the woods near the summit of South Mountain—where the infantry boys were fighting in the brush among the rocks. It was a panoramic moving-picture.

General Cox's division, which had been ordered up to support General Pleasonton, left its bivouac near Middletown at 6 A. M. The First Brigade reached the scene of action about 9 A. M., and was sent up the Old Sharpsburg road, by General Pleasonton, to feel the enemy and ascertain if he held the crest on that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the case, and General Cox having arrived with the other brigade, and information having been received from General Reno that the column would be supported by the whole corps, the division was ordered to assault the position. Two 20-pounder Parrotts of Simmonds' battery and two sections of McMullin's battery were left in the rear in position near the turnpike, where they did good service during the day against the enemy's batteries in the gap. Colonel Scammon's brigade

was deployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope to the left of the road, with the object of turning the enemy's right if possible. It succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the enemy who was posted behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the fire of a battery which poured in canister and case-shot on the regiment on the right of the brigade. Colonel Crook's brigade marched in columns at supporting distance. A section of McMullin's battery under Lieutenant Crome (killed while serving one of his guns), was moved up with great difficulty and opened with canister at very short range on the enemy's infantry, by whom, after having done considerable execution, it was silenced and forced to withdraw. One regiment of Crook's brigade was now deployed on Scammon's left and the other two in his rear, and they, several times, entered the first line and relieved the regiments in front of them when hard pressed. A section of Simmonds' battery was brought up and placed in an open space in the woods where it did good service during the rest of the day.

The enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a point more to the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. It was now about noon; a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours during which the rest of the corps was coming up. General Wilcox's division was the first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain General Cox advised him to consult General Pleasonton as to a position; the latter indicated that

on the right, afterwards taken up by General Hooker. General Wilcox was in the act of moving to occupy this ground when he received an order from General Reno to move up the Old Sharpsburg road and take a position to its right, overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support General Cox at his request. One section of Cook's battery was placed in position near the turn of the road (on the crest) and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right of the road when the enemy suddenly opened (at 150 yards) with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused a temporary panic in which the guns were nearly lost. But the Seventy-ninth New York and Seventeenth Michigan promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire and moved out to protect the guns with which Captain Cook had remained. Order was soon restored and the division formed in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as possible under the shelter of the hillside until the whole line advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery in front but also to that of the batteries on the other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily.

Shortly before this Generals Burnside and Reno arrived at the base of the mountain; the former directed the latter to move up the divisions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Willcox, and to move upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was informed that General Hooker (who had just been directed to attack on the right) was well advanced up the mountain.

General Reno then went to the front and assumed the direction of affairs, the positions having been explained to him by General Pleasonton. Shortly before this time General McClellan arrived at the point occupied by General Burnside, and his headquarters were located there until the conclusion of the action. General Sturgis had left his camp at 1 P. M. and reached the scene of action about 3:30 P. M. Clark's battery, of his division, was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and two regiments (Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire) were detached by General Reno and sent forward a short distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Willcox's, and Rodman's division was divided; Colonel Fairchild's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and Colonel Harland's under General Rodman's personal supervision on the right.

The order to move the whole line forward and take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere routed and fled.

Our chief loss was in Willcox's division. The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of our infantry, but its position was made untenable and it was hastily removed and not again put in position near us; but the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of shot and shell.

Cook's battery now re-opened fire. Sturgis' division was moved to the front of Willcox's, occupying the new ground

gained on the further side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. The enemy made an effort to turn our left about dark, but were repulsed by Fairchild's brigade and Clark's battery.

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another effort to regain the lost ground—attacking along Sturgis' front and part of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until nearly 9 o'clock, several charges being made by the enemy and repulsed with slaughter, and we finally occupied the highest part of the mountain.

General Reno was killed just before sunset while making a reconnaissance to the front and the command of corps devolved upon General Cox. In General Reno the nation lost one of its best general officers; he was a skillful soldier, a brave and honest man.

There was no firing after 10 o'clock and the troops slept on their arms ready to renew the fight at daylight, but the enemy quietly retired from our front during the night abandoning their wounded and leaving their dead in large numbers scattered over the field.

It was after dark and the battle ended when we began the ascent of the mountain. At times we halted to let ambulance trains pass down to the rear with their ghastly loads of wounded—on their way to field hospitals, the quiet of the night disturbed only by words of command, swearing of the teamsters, and the groanings and prayers and swearing of the wounded and their pitiful cries for "water." When we arrived at close supporting distance to the then line of battle

we bivouacked for the night, time near midnight, and was the first opportunity for rest and sleep since in the forenoon before leaving Frederick City. Flitting lights showed that the work of succoring the wounded was in progress.

Before daylight the morning of September 15th the enemy retreated; our lines carefully reconnoitered to the front and the right of the line was kept within close supporting distance. We, of our brigade, breakfasted and then inspected the wreck of battle—all about, in field and brush of the mountain side. Late in the afternoon we marched through Crampton's Gap and after passing the crest we marched by a school-house; the well was being used as a burial vault for the rebel dead—that being the easiest and quickest way of disposing of the fast decaying bodies. We marched through Boonsboro and to the left where we halted in an open field and bivouacked for the night.

The next morning—September 16th—there was some firing by batteries of field guns on the heights near Antietam Creek; we were rushed to close supporting distance and lay down in line of battle, and could see men and guns silhouetted against the sky-line and two lines of battle lying down—sheltered by the crown of the hill.

After dark we were moved closer to the front and halted "in column by company" and rations were issued. Our beef was driven on the hoof; a given number of cattle would be driven to a regiment for slaughter and quick issue to the companies—for distribution to the men. Some cattle made a break and in the darkness rushed over and among the dead-

tired men—who tried to "save the meat." General Mansfield —who was nearby—shouted, "Let them go, boys, you won't have time to cook them."

About 10 P. M., the night of September 16th, we heard the command "Fall in! Fall in!" We formed and started to join Hooker's Corps which had forded the Antietam in the afternoon, and later—under cover of the night—had worked so close to the enemy's line that the talking of the men could be heard. We crossed the Antietam on a stone bridge—which is now known as "Hooker's Bridge," muffled our tin cups, coffee kettles, etc., so as to repress sounds all possible; commands were given in low tones; the talking of the men was repressed, and about the only sound was of scattered picket firing at the front and the mingled noises of men and artillery being rushed into position. After midnight we arrived at the George Line farm buildings and when massed "in column by company" stacked arms; we needed and wanted water—but guards had been placed at the wells to "keep the water for the wounded"—which was strongly suggestive of expected occurrences on the morrow.

We were now at Antietam battlefield—a place which was to be made sacred, the next day, by the blood of 23,334 American soldiers—12,410 Union and 10,924 Confederates; the accident of birth and environment determined if they wore "the blue" or "the grey."

We were massed "in column by company" in a cornfield; the night was close, air heavy, some fog and the smoke from the skirmish firing of the late evening and picket firing of the

night and from stragglers' bivouac fires—to the rear—hung low; the only lights the twinkling flashes of fire-flies—kept in motion by the movement of men, mules and horses. The air was perfumed with a mixture of crushed green cornstalks, rag-weed and clover. We made our beds between the rows of corn and did not unbuckle or remove accoutrements. The night sounds—the scattered firing and occasional rattle of musketry on the picket lines—to the front; the mingled low-toned conversation of the men, occasional neighing of horses, barking of dogs—at the farm houses, crowing of roosters—disturbed at an unusual hour, and the chirping of crickets; Katy-dids joined in the night chorus with high pitch and speed. Slowly the morning came on. There was some rain-fall and as it cooled the air the pitch of the katy-dids fell and their speed reduced proportionately until the "Did" was a long-drawn-out- quaver—as if it had a tired feeling and did not like the company. If we could have raised our voices in song, it would have been:

"Just before the battle, Mother, I am thinking most of you,
While upon the field we're watching, with the enemy in view,
Comrades brave around me lying, filled with thoughts of home and God,
For well they know that on the morrow some will sleep beneath the sod.

The Refrain:

Farewell, Mother, you may never,
You may never, Mother,
Press me to your heart again,
But oh! you'll not forget me,
Mother, you will not forget me,
If I'm numbered with the slain."

MAJ. GEN. JOSEPH E. HOOKER, 1ST CORPS,
COMMANDING THE RIGHT WING—SEPT. 17, 1862.

BRIG. GEN. ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS, 1ST DIVISION 12TH ARMY CORPS.
AFTER GEN. MANSFIELD WAS KILLED HE COMMANDED THE 12TH CORPS; WHEN
GEN. HOOKER WAS WOUNDED ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE RIGHT
WING SEPT. 17-18, 1862.

MAJ. GEN. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE, 9TH CORPS,
COMMANDING THE LEFT WING—SEPT. 17-18, 1862.

Before dawn there was an outburst of cannon thunder—this died down in a spiteful growl. The roosters at Miller's, Poffenberger's, Mumma's and other neighboring farm houses crowed lustily. As soon as it was light—so that objects could be seen at close range—the battle on the right began; first a rattle of musketry—followed by cheers and the rebel yell; then a roll of musketry—as parts of one or both lines of infantry got busy; we could see flashes of fire from the muskets; here and there a battery hurried into position and opened fire—the rebels answering gun for gun and "Hell had let loose!"

At daylight Hooker's Corps was the extreme right of the battle-line—facing west; from right to left the brigades of Anderson and Magilton—commanded by Brig. Gen. Meade, and to the left the brigade of Hartsuff—with 12th Mass., 11th Pa., 13th Mass. and 83rd N. Y. The right flank was "in air"—no natural protection—and to protect the flank the brigades of Hoffman and Patrick faced north. At daylight the brigades of Hartsuff and Gibbons were thrown forward—with a part of Meade's Division in support. At 6:45 A. M., Hartsuff's brigade (with Gibbons to its left) had advanced through the bloody cornfield and was on line with its south edge.

The Charge of the Light Brigade—"The Immortal 600"—has been celebrated in poetry, song and story; its loss was 342 killed, wounded and missing—57 per cent. The 12th Mass. had nine companies "present for duty"—268 men were on the firing line about four hours. *War Department official record shows its loss was 59 killed, 155 wounded, 10 missing—total 224; the loss was 84 per cent.; nine men had been detailed to

assist their wounded from the firing line; only Captain Cook, Adjt. Dehon, Lt. Clark and 32 men (one of whom was J. E. Gilman, Past Commander-in-Chief G. A. R.) left the field with the colors.

The battle then on extended from our extreme right—in the north end of West Woods—to the left and across Hagerstown Pike, about Miller's farm buildings, stacks, and outhouses: our edge of the cornfield—in which the rebels were partly concealed and our edge of East Woods and to the left of Mumma's and Roulette farm buildings.

The general lines of battle are shown by "Map of the Battlefield of Antietam"; the Confederate line—from its left to right—Hood, D. H. Hill, Evans, Jones and Toombs; a part of Toombs with Archer, Gregg, Pender, Brockenborough and Branch—in rear of that part of Toombs—holding Burnside in check at the bridge.

The Union line positions—right to left—Doubleday, Williams, Meade, Greene, Ricketts, Slocum, Sedgewick, Hancock, Couch, French, Irwin; Brooks and Richardson were west of Antietam Creek. On the east side—under Porter—Humphreys, Morell and Sykes, and—under Burnside—Crook, Sturgis, Miles, Rodman and Scammon.

The light dotted line ..... indicating Williams' advance into West Woods *is not correct*, the heavy - - - - indicates the line of advance of the 125th P. V.—of First Brigade of Williams' Division.

* The War Department in figuring percent loss used the morning report of September 16th, and made the loss 57%; subsequent to that morning report Co. H—the largest company—was detached and was not on the firing line.



THE BATTLEFIELD OF ANTIETAM.

The light dotted line ..... indicating the advance of Greene—of Mansfield's Corps—to about on a line with Dunker Church, is correct for the 34th and 78th New York regiments only, they having been sent to the support of the 125th P. V., covered the same line of advance made by the 125th and reached our battle-line about half an hour after we had taken position to the right rear of Dunker Church in West Woods.

The battle was opened with great spirit by the Confederate batteries—opposite Doubleday—and were promptly answered by Union batteries confronting, the guns doing excellent service in compelling changes in position—and thus temporarily silencing the enemy's artillery. Gibbon's brigade moved forward to commence the Union infantry attack—at our extreme right—and was closely followed by Phelp's brigade in support; about twenty minutes later Patrick's brigade was also ordered forward. The advance line was Sixth Wisconsin—to the right, and Second Wisconsin to its left; they advanced into a cornfield. The right wing was "in air" and was outflanked by the Confederates. The section of Campbell's battery under Lieutenant Stewart was also brought into action on an eminence to the rear, to fire over the heads of the troops—in answer to the enemy's batteries in front. Gibbon's entire brigade soon became hotly engaged. Phelp's brigade had followed that of Gibbon's and reached an open space beyond the woods where Campbell's battery was posted, and then moved by the flank and deployed forward in a cornfield in the rear of Gibbon's command. The enemy's line having outflanked that of Gibbon's, Colonel Post, who was in

command of the Second Regiment of U. S. Sharp-Shooters—was ordered to move to the right and front, advance his left, and attacked that portion of the enemy's line that flanked ours. In this engagement the Sharp-Shooters suffered severely, and Colonel Post was wounded, after capturing two battle flags from the enemy. Patrick's brigade closely followed the two others, advanced and for a short time took post in the same cornfield as a support. A strong enfilading fire came from the woods against our troops in the cornfield and to meet this General Patrick was ordered to occupy and hold the woods, detaching, however, one of his regiments to support Campbell's battery, a section of which had moved forward to the right, in the vicinity of a barn and some haystacks.

The movements of the 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana into the woods to drive off the enemy, which were acting against our right flank, was simultaneous with those of Patrick's brigade—moving forward into the woods at the same time. The two regiments named took position in advance of and parallel to the rest of Gibbon's line. Patrick's three regiments had scarcely taken their position in the woods before a body of the enemy appeared on their right guarding a battery of light guns they had posted there. One of Patrick's regiments was sent to watch that battery and the 23rd New York, under Colonel Hoffman, was detached for that purpose. The two remaining regiments—the 21st and 35th New York—closed up on the 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana, and all moved forward together. The enemy, previous to this, had kept up a brisk firing, but was sheltered by a series of rocky ledges, which afforded them almost perfect security; they poured in

VIEW-POINT IS WEST OF HAGERSTOWN TURNPIKE NEAR DUNKER CHURCH, LOOKING TOWARD EAST WOODS IN THE DISTANCE.
SMOKETOWN ROAD IS TO THE RIGHT.

1—SMOKETOWN ROAD. 2—HAGERSTOWN TURNPIKE. 3—AT TIME OF THE BATTLE WAS A CLOVER FIELD PARTLY PLOUGHED. 4—EAST WOODS.
5—LOCATION OF MUMMA BUILDINGS. 6—LOCATION OF "THE BLOODY CORN FIELD."

heavy volleys of musketry. To meet this increase of fire Patrick's two regiments were thrown forward in the first line. To all appearances the enemy had been strongly re-inforced and they not only resisted our advance but moved to try and capture Campbell's battery and regain possession of the cornfield; this charge was repulsed by fire of the 2nd and 6th Wisconsin regiments, by repeated discharges of the battery which fired double canisters, and by the flank fire of the 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana Regiments—of Gibbon's Brigade, and the 21st and 35th New York of Patrick's Brigade—these four regiments having taken up a position perpendicular to their former one which enabled them to pour in a heavy fire on the flanks of the charging columns. This united effort drove the enemy back—saved the guns and gave us a renewed possession of the cornfield. General Patrick now pushed his regiments up to the road, which he held firmly for some time and captured two battle flags from the rebel regiment which advanced against him; he was finally attacked both on his right flank and rear and compelled to fall back; he withdrew to a line of rocks at right angles to the general direction of the strip of woods—and about fifteen rods from them—where he remained waiting for ammunition and re-enforcements to be sent him.

General Williams, of Mansfield's Corps, now came up with re-enforcements. He sent a regiment to watch the rebel force that supported the enfilading battery—which was acting against the right of Patrick's line—and the other regiments were notified of the nature of the ground and the position of the enemy and were instructed by General Patrick as to the

position they ought to assume to enfilade the enemy's line and drive him from a strong position near the Dunker Church, which seemed to be the key of the battlefield. The re-enforcements did not attack in the right place and they were soon swept away by a terrific fire against their left and front from the enemy behind the rocks whom they could not see. Their line gave way and the main body of the rebels advanced. We had no troops left to stand the shock; those then engaged had been fighting since daylight and being out of ammunition, were obliged to fall back.

Patrick's brigade—covering the retreat—resisted the enemy gallantly and retiring in perfect order. Campbell's command lost 38 men in killed and wounded—including its commander among the latter, and having had twenty-seven horses killed was no longer in condition for active service and was compelled to retire behind the supports of Sedgwick's Division. It was soon followed by Gibbon's and Phelp's brigades—exhausted as they were by long-continued fighting, nearly out of ammunition, and too few in number to keep back the overpowering forces that were advancing.

The battle on the right had opened at about 5:00 A. M.; a heavy force of the enemy were concealed in a cornfield—of about 30 acres—and was revealed by the rays of the sun glinting from bayonets projecting above the corn. Orders were immediately given to mass all spare batteries, about 30 guns, on the right of this field and to open with canister at once; in less than a half hour every stalk of corn was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain Confeder-

ates lay in rows as they had stood in their ranks a few minutes before. That firing of canister at short range made it "the Bloody Cornfield." The natural peaceful appearance of the previous night-fall had been changed to a bloody dismal battle-field—covered with strewn and trampled green cornstalks, personal equipment, and the dead and wounded.

Our Brigade, massed in column by company, moved first toward the cornfield and when we got where the shells went over our heads most men ducked—then would straighten up with a sickly kind of a grin; from the rear of the cornfield we were moved to the left and deployed—forming line of battle—near the South end of East Woods in which the two lines of battle were then fiercely engaged and were not a hundred yards apart.

Just before we entered East Woods stragglers and wounded, and riderless horses, drifted past the right and left of the regiment and surged to the rear; one wounded boy who was shot through the left wrist, holding his right hand over lower forearm and writhing with pain, called out as he went by, "Go in, boys! Go in, boys! Give them Hell!"

Owing to the condition of the atmosphere a cloud of smoke hung low and we could see but a short distance; we could see flashes of fire and hear the "Zipp—Ping"—and a thud when bullet hit an object; our lines—in front of us—practically had melted away but "Johnnie Reb" was on the spot and was firing at us from behind trees and ledges of rocks—scattered here and there—and from which we dislodged them,

but they kept up a hot fire while being pressed back; in clouds of smoke—as would lift—we could see men running, stopping to load and firing again. We were now in the thick of the fight; had broken through the rebel line and with both "flanks in air" were ordered to "Halt!"—"Lie down!"; again advanced and it was "Halt, lie down!"; we made two or three like movements before our final advance into West Woods; whilst we were lying down—in open fields—bullets from the right rear crossing our line and were fired by our own men at the rebel line which remained intact on their front.

Just after passing from East Woods we made our first "Halt, lie down!" and whilst in that position General Mansfield—who was near our right front—was mortally wounded; men from the 125th Pennsylvania carried him to the rear. At this time the 125th regiment was in a clover field—partly plowed—to the right of the Smoketown Road, and due to the two lines of fence, either side of the road, Company B was doubled on Company A which on that day was second Company from the left of the regiment, Company G being the right of the regiment. At this time General Hooker came from the rear—with his horse on a dead gallop—and accompanied only by an orderly; when he saw Colonel Higgins, who was on his knees in a fence corner—where he would be partially protected from the firing in front and be able to observe the movements of the enemy—said "Colonel, what regiment is this, what is in front of you?" The Colonel answered, "125th P. V.—Nothing but rebels"; General Hooker pointed to West Woods and gave the command "Advance and hold that woods." Bullets were like hail, his horse was wounded

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VIEW OF A PART OF THE BATTLEFIELD, LOOKING NORTH, FROM A PAINTING BY CAPT. JAMES HOPE, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE BATTLE.
1—WEST WOODS AND DUNKER CHURCH. 2—EAST WOODS. 3—SMOKETOWN ROAD, LEADING TO DUNKER CHURCH.

in several places and was frantic with pain. Colonel Higgins said "General, you had better get out of this," and he replied "Guess I had" and at that instant a musket ball hit him in the lower instep of right foot, he then wheeled his horse and galloped to the rear.

The Mumma home, barn, and out-buildings were burning and with the smoke of battle obscured the field so that extreme caution was necessary. As we were being shelled by massed batteries—located near Dunker Church—two or three of us crawled to the left and took cover from a disabled Confederate cannon—which had been abandoned; the "Johnnies" thought we intended to capture it, so they turned a gun on us and the first shot went through a wheel; when the spokes flew we rolled over and crawled out of range—and you can imagine how our new blue uniforms looked after the process.

Before crossing to the left of Smoketown Road a staff officer, a Lieutenant, passed from the left of the regiment to the right carrying a verbal order: The horse was on a dead gallop with side to rifle and shell-fire of the enemy—in and about the east front of West Woods, the horse's neck was stretched to the utmost, the long rein was held loosely and swaying with the plunging pace of the horse—struggling over the ploughed ground; the rider was "wobbling" perceptibly; a shell hit the horse in lower flank and rider and horse tumbled forward in a heap; the Lieutenant was jarred sober; when he got back to us the first thing he said was, "It was a hell of a wonder I was not killed, and me so damned drunk."

Our next advance carried the line so that "Co. B" lay down at the near fence of the lane leading from Smoketown Road to the Mumma farm buildings; the other nine companies to the right of Smoketown Road in the clover field. The fence was post and rail; cannon balls made the splinters fly; we lay as thin as possible and stuck our heads in the furrow—turned away from the fence.

The smoke lifted and we could see the enemy in West Woods; in the meantime a battery advanced to and in line with our right-front and opened fire on the Confederate Artillery—to the left and in front of Dunker Church—and compelled its removal, to get out of the deadly range; this relieved us and we started for West Woods. In this movement the regiment swung away from Smoketown Road and to close the gap we scrambled over the two fences—under sharp musketry fire from West Woods; dead men were hanging on the fences and we were lively to get down. The near side of Hagerstown Pike was rail fence but it was so completely wrecked as to not be an obstruction. When we got possession of West Woods the skirmishers (Co. G) were pushed down from the crest of the hill and close to an open field, and the regiment took possession of the crest. If at that time we had been properly supported, and a right effort had been made to protect the flanks of this advanced battle-line, the key to the battle-field would have been held and Lee's left would have been annihilated. From the time we passed East Woods no Union troops were in sight to our left. Dead and wounded lay about in every conceivable position; the trees freshly scarred, and broken branches hanging and littering the

ground. The walls of the church were scarred by bullets and daylight let in through holes made by shells. We could look to the left and see rebel formations being made to drive us out—and our regiment alone in the rebel lines without support.

Two regiments were sent to our support—one was 34th New York and the other the 78th New York.

The skirmishers were driven in and a partial cross fire combed the ground—made the fallen dead leaves move as if alive and active—and the slaughter began. When we opened fire the crash, cheers, and cries of the wounded made a fearful din and it was impossible to hear orders. No words can convey to the inexperienced a comprehensive idea of the surging and plunging of two great armies in deadly battle—a hurricane of death sweeping the earth. At this time the 34th New York moved by left flank to get into line, but only about two companies got in position on the firing line; the balance of the regiment and 78th New York were covered by the 125th regiment and for that reason they could not aid us at the critical time—"too late."

The cross fires from the right and left caused disintegration—first from the right and extended to the left; the first I knew was to be almost alone and a mass of yelling and firing rebels only about fifty yards distant.

In the clover field was a battery of twelve pounder brass guns—which were double-shotted with canister; the Commander sat on his horse as if on parade and with his sword was motioning us to lie down or separate. We obliqued out

of range and when we uncovered the guns they discharged as if one gun; lanes were mowed through the mass of men; they pulled their hats down to keep the dirt out of their eyes and pressed forward. One of our men (Tresse) did lie down, the rebels charged over him until driven back by the canister from the guns; the rebels retreated over him and after they had gone he got up and came into our lines.

When we passed to the rear of the battery we laid down and again began firing to "support the battery" and we stopped their rush when within about twenty-five yards of the guns; their dead and wounded lay like a winrow in a hayfield, and scattered where they fell. The next day I counted as many as fifteen lying in touch.

The time was now about 10 A. M., and we had begun about 5.00 A. M. without sleep and no breakfast, and were about exhausted.

When the 125th P. V., formed line of battle—after passing through the south end of East Woods—M. C. Huyette was in the last file to the extreme left of the regiment; the lay of the land and the smoke of battle was such as that we could see to the left but short distance; there was no battle-line in sight, to the left, but there was artillery firing from our line at our left rear. Soon after we rallied behind the battery in the open field, partly plowed—in front of East Woods—a part of the 6th Corps, under Franklin, came to our support; at that time the line of battle to our left had advanced to nearly on line with the then burning Mumma buildings. Up to that time there had been no heavy firing to our left. Burnside's artillery—on their side of Antietam Creek—was firing but his infantry were not engaged.

HAWKIN'S ZOUAVES CHARGING ON CEMETERY HILL SHARPSBURG IN VALLEY IN DISTANCE.

The Second Corps, Gen. Edwin Sumner, marched from Keedysville about 7.30 A. M. and arrived on the battle-field about 9.30 A. M. The First Division—Brigadier General Hancock—forded the Antietam and moved forward on a line nearly parallel to the creek and formed line of battle, by brigades, in a ravine behind the high ground overlooking Roulette's house; Meagher's brigade immediately advanced and soon became engaged with the enemy—posted to the left and in front of Roulette's house; it continued to advance under a heavy fire nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's farm buildings, the enemy being posted in strong force in a sunken road directly to its front. This road is now known as "Bloody Lane."

When the battle to our left developed French, Brooks and Richardson battled fiercely. The fierce fighting on the right, under Hooker, had practically ended and Burnside not yet engaged.

The battle had been opened by the first corps advancing on the extreme right—where Lee had massed a crushing force against it; the Corps maintained the struggle unaided until it was virtually destroyed and its commander—Hooker—severely wounded. Then the 12th Corps moved out to meet a like fate, with the death of its Corps Commander Mansfield; after they had been fought out the 2nd Corps marched into a similar struggle—and to like destruction.

The early morning of the battle the Confederates had opened heavy artillery firing on Burnside's line; his batteries were soon brought to bear on the Confederate guns—which

were soon silenced and two caissons blown up. About that time the General ordered French to make disposition to carry the stone bridge over the Antietam Creek, but to wait further orders before making the attack. Burnside then threw his lines forward; at 10.00 o'clock he received an order to begin the attack. Burnside then ordered Gen. Rodman to cross over at the ford below the bridge, and join on to the left of the command which was to be thrown over the bridge. Official records show that about two thousand Union troops forded Antietam Creek south of the stone bridge and was in position such as it was then possible to crush the right of Lee's battle-line; in numbers it was superior to the Confederate troops which was then holding Burnside in check. No attack was made and these troops recrossed Antietam Creek. The best opportunity for a decisive victory—in the battle—was lost to the Union forces. From General Crook's positon it was found to be almost impossible to carry the bridge; General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that purpose and he immediately sent forward the 2nd Maryland and 6th New Hampshire, which regiments made several successive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back by the galling fire of the enemy—direct fire of about 1,500 Confederates concentrated on the bridge and the approach thereto. The batteries of Burnside, on the left of the bridge, then concentrated their firing on the woods above the bridge, and General Sturgis was ordered to detail the 51st Pennsylvania and 51st New York to assault the bridge and carry it at all hazards. General Sturgis by judicious posting of these two regiments in rear of a spur which fronted the bridge succeeded in pro-

tecting them from the enemy's fire until they reached the crest of the spur—at which point they commenced their charge and carried the bridge at the point of the bayonet at about 1.30 P. M. the whole division following him.

The regiments separated at the head of the bridge, to the right and left, and moved up the steep banks crowning the heights immediately beyond. Our loss at this place was fearful, the enemy being posted in rifle-pits and behind barricades within easy musket range of our men and almost entirely concealed and covered from our shots.

Colonel Crook's brigade crossed immediately after Sturgis' division and took its position in support—in rear. General Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the fords below and after a sharp fight of musketry and artillery joined on the left of Sturgis, Scammon's brigade crossing after him and taking position in rear and in support. General Wilcox's division was ordered to cross and take position on the right of General Sturgis.

Quoting from the excellent report of General Cox:

"The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches with stone parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach to the bridge at either end. The valley in which the stream runs is quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher lands above by ascending through ravines above and below; the other ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about half that distance

below. On the hillside immediately above the bridge was a stone fence, running parallel to the stream; the turns of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks made of rail and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters. Beside the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. The crest of the first hill above the bridge is curved toward the stream at the extremes forming a sort of natural tete-de-pont. The next ridge beyond rises somewhat higher, though with less regularity, the depression between the two being but slight, and the distance varying in places from 300 to 700 yards."

The dispositions of the forces named were completed about 3 o'clock and general Cox was then ordered to move forward with the whole command—except Sturgis' division which was left in reserve—in the order in which they were formed, and attack the town of Sharpsburg and the heights to the left. The following batteries accompanied their divisions; with Sturgis' Division, Clark's and Durrell's; with Wilcox's Division, Cook's battery; with Cox's Division, part of Simmonds' and Muhlenberg's battery—of Rodman's Division—was on that side of Antietam Creek during part of the engagement. The officers and soldiers moved forward with the greatest enthusiasm, driving the enemy before them. General Wilcox, with General Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the Sharpsburg road and succeeded in reaching the outskirts of the village. General Rodman succeeded in carrying the main heights on the left of the town, the 9th New York regi-

ment capturing one of the most formidable of the enemy's batteries. At this juncture of the battle the enemy was largely re-enforced by General A. P. Hill's light division which had just arrived from Harper's Ferry and by numerous batteries from their extreme left. During the attack General Rodman was forced to bear more to the left than was intended when the advance was ordered and General Cox was forced to move him more to the right with a view to strengthening the line, during which movement General Rodman was mortally wounded while gallantly leading his command to the assault.

At this time Colonel Harland's brigade was driven back, leaving the battery which they had captured. Colonel Scammon's brigade changed its front to the rear on its right, thus protecting our left flank. It was now nearly sundown. General Sturgis' division was then ordered forward in support, and, notwithstanding the hard work in the early part of the day and a lack of ammunition they moved with the greatest alacrity and enthusiasm, holding the enemy at bay and fighting at close quarters until long after dark.

It was assumed that the enemy had been strongly re-enforced and that our advance line could not be re-enforced, and, acting on that assumption, the command was ordered to fall back to the crests above the bridge and assume the same formation that was made before the attack.

The organizations to which we belonged had been fought to a stand-still. When the sun went down there was heavy artillery firing—both lines—and it looked like a great red ball of blood; as the darkness of the evening increased the artillery firing gradually ceased.

In the morning a large proportion of the soldiers in the new regiments were "boys," but when the roar of battle ceased we were *men*.

The men were physically exhausted, hungry and but few had food, thirsty and without water, sad at heart—for comrades who had been killed or wounded, depressed in spirit—for the reason that whilst victory had been possible; at almost any hour of the day, we looked forward to the morrow with forebodings of possible defeat or the usual retreat—in face of an enemy inferior in number.

An estimate of the Confederate forces, made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, etc., previous to the battle of Antietam, was as follows:

General T. J. Jackson's corps	24,778
General James Longstreet's corps	23,342
General D. H. Hill's two divisions	15,525
General J. E. B. Stuart, cavalry	6,400
Generals Ransom's and Jenkins' brigade	3,000
Forty-six regiments not included in above	18,400
Artillery, estimated at 400 guns	6,000
Total	97,445

Jackson's corps, 24,778 and A. P. Hill's corps, probably about 15,000, were both at Harper's Ferry until after 7.30 A. M., September 17th. A. P. Hill's corps—other than Thomas' brigade—was put in motion at 7.30 A. M. and the head of the column arrived on the battle-field of Sharpsburg, a distance of seventeen miles, at 2.30 P. M. and strengthened

the troops opposed to Burnside's line of advance, and it was further strengthened about 5 o'clock by the arrival of a part of Jackson's corps. When the battle opened Lee had less than 40,000 men at Antietam—on the basis of General Banks' estimate; allowance should be made for over-estimating the forces of the enemy by officers in the Northern Army.

A careful study of all the reports shows that when the battle of Antietam opened the Confederate force approximated 35,225 men; the Union Army was officially reported "present and accounted for, 87,176," and of these approximately 47,000 comprised the actual fighting force—making a total, both armies, 82,225; the "nominal list of killed and wounded" shows that 29% *of those actually engaged in the battle were killed and wounded.*

Our own forces, present and fit for duty, were estimated as follows:

First Corps	14,856
Second Corps	18,813
Fifth Corps (one division not arrived)	12,930
Sixth Corps	12,300
Ninth Corps	13,819
Twelfth Corps	10,126
Cavalry Division	4,320
Total in action	87,164

General Fitz John Porter's corps, the Fifth, 12,930 men, practically was held in reserve—with other troops—and its total loss was 17 killed, 90 wounded, and two missing—109 men. McClellan practically had *about* 30,000 *men at Antietam who did not fire a shot during the battle*—were held in reserve.

After night-fall effort was made for succoring the wounded, issuing rations and ammunition, and men finding their own commands. Roll-call was made to determine the losses in killed and wounded but the lists as made up were "nominal losses"—not actual—and in almost every instance were below actual.

The "nominal losses" of the 125th Pennsylvania—as determined the night of September 17th—were 145, *but* subsequent official regimental report made the total loss in killed, wounded, and missing, 226.

Personal experiences and observations of places and movements, on that day of fierce battle, justify the sustaining of statements made—and following—by official record.

In the early morning fighting the Dunker Church was considered "the key of the battle-field." It has been made of record that the 125th P. V.—unaided directly—advanced through East Woods and to right rear of the Church; the "high water" line of our battle-line advance is there marked by a monument dedicated to the regiment.

(oro, 172—Official Reports—Series X Vol. XIX)

"HDQRS. ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH, PA. VOLS.,
Camp near Sandy Hook, Md., September 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by my regiment in the action near Sharpsburg on the 17th of September, 1862.

I was ordered by General Crawford to advance in close column, at daylight, through some fields to East Woods where there was heavy firing at that time going on. I was then ordered into the woods and then back again by General Crawford, then to throw out skirmishers and again advance through the woods until I reached the other side of the timber, and then deploy in line of battle and advance through the

MONUMENT—125TH P. V.
IS LOCATED AT MOST ADVANCED POINT OF BATTLE LINE IN WEST WOODS—RIGHT REAR OF DUNKER CHURCH.

fields and there halt. At this place my command was exposed to a most terrific fire of musketry, shot, and shell. I then fell back a few rods, by order of General Crawford, where I remained some minutes, and was again ordered forward to the crest of the hill, which I was to hold.

At this time some colonel—whose name I do not know—told me that his troops were falling back for want of ammunition, and asked me to advance to his support. I immediately reported this to General Crawford who ordered me to advance at once. I gave the command and my men started forward with a yell, driving the enemy before them and gaining possession of East Woods. Here I took some prisoners, whom I sent to the rear. Again I was ordered to advance and halt in line with a battery. Before reaching the battery I took a number of prisoners, some of whom came running back with white handkerchiefs tied on their guns and gave themselves up. At the battery I gave the command for my men to "lie down"—whilst awaiting further orders. About this time the fire of the enemy slackened somewhat, only some shots from their sharpshooters being fired and these at mounted officers and artillery horses. Previous to this General Mansfield fell, some of my men carrying him off the field on their muskets until a blanket was procured. General Hooker here came up to me and inquired if any troops were in the woods in front. I replied, "None but rebels," and that my command was in front. While talking to me his horse was shot by some of the enemy's sharpshooters. I remarked to him that his horse was shot. He replied, "I see," turned and went away.

In a short time I received an order to advance into West Woods. I gave the order "Forward," my regiment advancing in splendid style and driving some South Carolina and Georgia troops back into West Woods. I halted at the edge of the woods, and ordered Captain McKeage, of Company G, to deploy his company as skirmishers. This done, I again advanced a short distance in the woods, and halted again to examine the enemy's position. I found him in force in my front and on my right. On looking around I discovered myself without support either in my rear or right, and, being the only mounted officer present, I gave my horse to Lieutenant Higgins and instructed him to ride back to the general, inform him of my situation, and ask him to send me support immediately or I would be unable to hold my position, and that the enemy would certainly flank me and cut me off, my command being at this time in advance of the whole corps.

I now ordered Captain McKeage to advance cautiously with his skirmishers, and, at the same time, the regiment to advance to the crest of a small hill. My skirmishers soon became engaged with the enemy who were advancing on my front in force. They continued to advance; I ordered my skirmishers to rally, and gave the command to "commence firing." A most destructive fire caused the enemy to halt. I held him here for some time, until I discovered two regiments of them moving around my right, while a brigade charged on my front. On looking around and finding no support in sight I was compelled to retire. Had I remained in my position two minutes longer I would have lost my whole command. I fell back to the rear of the first batteries, when an artillery officer rode up to me saying that his battery was on the left front and entirely unsupported, and asking me if I would support him. I replied in the affirmative, and marched my command to the battery and took my position.

General Franklin now rode up and inquiring what regiment this was, I replied the One Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Pennsylvania; he said my position was right and he was glad I was there, and ordered me to remain there which I did. I stayed there until the One Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Pennsylvania coming up under command of its Major, General Franklin ordered me to form it in my rear and take command of both regiments.

My adjutant, R. M. Johnston, who acted as major in the absence of Major Lawrence who has been in the Georgetown hospital for some time, fell, mortally wounded. His conduct on the field during the whole action was most gallant. All my officers and men behaved in splendid style, particularly Captain McKeage and his company who acted as skirmishers during the engagement.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JACOB HIGGINS,

Colonel, Comdg. One hundred and twenty-fifth Regt. Pa. Vols.

Col. J. F. KNIPE,

Forty-sixth Pa. Vols. Comdg. 1st Brig., 1st Div., Banks' A. C."

It has been claimed by different organizations that subsequent to the 125th P. V. and 34th and 78th New York retreating from West Woods, near right of Dunker church, they had occupied the same position; all such claims are refuted by

personal observation and also official records by commanding officers in the Confederate Army. General Wm. T. Wofford commanded Hood's brigade (Texas brigade) and has made record:

"By this time our line commenced giving way, when I ordered them back under cover of the woods to the left of the church, where we halted and waited for support, none arriving. After some time the enemy commenced advancing in full force. Seeing the hopelessness and folly of making a stand with our shattered brigade and a remnant from other commands, the men being greatly exhausted and many of them out of ammunition, I determined to fall back to a fence in our rear, where we met the long looked for re-enforcements, and at the same time received an order from General Hood to fall back farther to the rear to rest and collect our men. After resting a short time we were moved back to the woods in the rear of the church from where we advanced to the fight in the morning, which position we held until late in the evening, when we were moved by the right flank in the direction of Sharpsburg to a place near the center of our line, where we remained during the night and next day, until the recrossing of the Potomac by our army was ordered."

Colonel E. M. Law, commanding a brigade, in his official report says:

"The right of my brigade rested at St. Mumma's Church (Dunker's Chapel). Across the road was an open field a quarter of a mile in width, extending along the whole front of the line and beyond it about 600 yards. This open space was bounded on the northeast (to my front) and the northwest (to my left) by woods"—(This was East Woods.)—"At one P. M. having been supplied with ammunition I was again ordered to the field and took position in the wood near the church. Here the brigade remained, under incessant cannonade, until near nightfall."

Other like Confederate record confirms statements made heretofore.

That which transpired in the Confederate line in West Woods and about Dunker Church—at place first occupied by the 125th P. V.—is covered by the official report of Brigadier General Kershaw:

"About 9 o'clock we were ordered forward to the relief of General Jackson's forces, then engaged on the left, in the wood in the rear of the church. The Georgia and Mississippi brigades were formed in a plowed field to the right and rear of the wood; my brigade in their rear in the same field. The enemy was discovered in the wood, advancing toward its right face, where some of our guns had been abandoned before our arrival. Perceiving this Major-General McLaws directed me to occupy that part of the woods in advance of them while our lines were being formed. For this purpose I ordered forward, at double-quick, Colonel Kennedy's Second South Carolina regiment to march by a flank to the extreme point of the wood; then by the front to enter it. Before the head of the regiment had reached the point, and when entangled in a rail fence, the enemy opened fire upon them from a point not more than sixty yards distant. They promptly faced to the front and returned the fire so rapidly as to drive the enemy almost immediately. At the same time the brigades of Cobb and Barksdale, now on their left, advanced to their support. I then hurried up my three remaining regiments—the Eighth, Lieutenant Colonel (A. J.) Hoole; Seventh, Colonel (D. W.) Aiken, and Third, Colonel Nance—and conducted them to the right of Colonel Kennedy, who by this time had advanced beyond the wood and to the left of the church, driving the enemy. I then ordered Read's battery to a position on the hill to the right of the wood and sent in Colonel Manning, who reported to me on the field, with Walker's brigade to the right of my own brigade. Our troops made constant progress for some time along the whole line, driving in column after column of the enemy. Colonel Aiken's regiment approached within 30 yards of one of the batteries, driving the men from the guns, and only gave way when enfiladed by a new battery placed in position near them, leaving Major White dead and one-half their men killed or wounded upon the field.

WRECK OF BATTLE—ANTIETAM.
(War-time photos—Brady series)

About this time the enemy was heavily re-enforced, and our line fell back to the wood—*which was never afterward taken from us.* Read's battery having suffered greatly in the loss of men and horses was withdrawn, by my order, when the infantry fell back. The lines were reorganized behind the fences, near where they entered the fight, and their exhausted cartridge-boxes replenished.

Later in the day we moved to the left of General Early's command, *which occupied the wood to the left of the church, where we remained until ordered to move across the river on Thursday night, September 18th.*"

That the fire on the right of our line was effective is of record by Brigadier General Paul J. Semmes, commanding his brigade in McLaw's division, and is covered as follows:

"I know of no particular cases of individual bravery, and can make no discriminations where all did so well, it appearing to be the determination of every one to do his whole duty, as the lists of casualties accompanying this report will testify, showing a loss of 894 killed, wounded, and missing out of about 2,200 with which I reached Gordonsville."

The fierce musketry firing of the day was at short range, and with the lines within fifty to sixty yards of each other.

Personal experience, when the battle of the day had ceased, was a day of intense excitement, tense nervous strain, severe physical effort and resultant exhaustion, without food since about midnight previous, and without water; in thought recited the 23rd Psalm, commended myself to Almighty God and without personal fear lay down with the root of a tree for a pillow, and with the darkness of night the only covering slept for hours undisturbed by the rattle of musketry on the skirmish lines to the front. The only dread the possibility for defeat on the morrow.

George Morgan in "The Issue"—a novel—gives the experience of one of his imaginary characters, a soldier on the battle-field of Antietam, as follows:

"It was gruesome and strange to him, sitting with prone figures almost within reach of his hand; and when he looked far and wide over the field—with its smouldering fires and flitting lights—a sense of sorrow and terror and the unpitifulness of God seized him. He was not on the crest of the sweet old earth—where were bird-song and cricket chirp and fire-side-joy and the thousand brightnesses he had known in times past; he was not on such an earth, but upon another world—an outer, darker, more savage world—a far plutonic spot in ether where one breathes away his breath without hope of the mercy of the Lord Jesus. If one's soul may suffer an ague, that Johnsey's suffered—being projected in spirit away from this dear world and off into outer space where there can be no warmth for the human heart. Even when death lays hold upon *one* there is bound to be sorrow; but, how, when upon undug graves lie thousands, comrades, better men perhaps than yourself—each lopped off of his loves and hopes?"

On the 18th the skirmishers of both lines kept busy; there was no artillery firing and no general fighting. In the afternoon an unauthorized flag of truce party went out to the left of the Smoketown Road; it was in charge of Lieutenant Garian Schollenberger of Company B 125th P. V., and was composed of Lieutenant Schollenberger, M. C. Huyette, Corporal Schollar, and James Houck.

The firing ceased for a few hundred yards on either side of Smoketown Road and we were met between the two skirmish lines by a rebel lieutenant—one of the "Louisiana Tigers"; we wanted to find the bodies of some dead comrades and

LUTHERAN CHURCH IN SHARPSBURG, EXTERIOR WAS HARD PLASTER FINISH, DAMAGED BY ARTILLERY FIRING.

succor any of their wounded comrades who might then be lying between the lines of firing; the rebel lieutenant wanted to obtain the body of his brother, who had been killed and left dead in our lines. We exchanged some dead. Looking at the line of dead rebels, with tears coursing his cheeks, the Lieutenant said "Most of my men lie there," and when we parted shook hands and said, "Hope we will not meet in battle tomorrow."

The day was spent in issuing rations and ammunition, men who had become separated from their commands finding their proper places, and resting as best we could with minnie balls whistling about.

On the night of the 18th-19th the rebels began their retreat; just before daylight their skirmish line departed in haste. With clothes dirty and torn and faces begrimed with dirt and smoke—furrowed here and there where perspiration had run down—it was a difficult matter to recognize comrades.

Burial parties were detailed and the work of digging long trenches for the dead was immediately begun; burial parties carried the bodies of the dead to the trenches and placed them for burial.

"Not a drum was heard nor a funeral note,"
As the mangled men were carried;
"Not a soldier discharged a farewell shot"
O'er the trenches where they were buried.
"No useless coffin inclosed their breasts,"
Nor in sheet nor in shroud we bound them,
"But we laid them like warriors taking their rest,"
With their old gray blankets 'round them."

Pits were dug into which to dump the dead animals. The whole field of battle was littered with abandoned caissons, cannon, rifles, swords, bayonets, dead animals, dead of both armies and accoutrements of the troops; and whilst burial parties were disposing of the human wreckage of the battle other details were engaged in gathering the abandoned material ennumerated; those not performing the above duties visited different points of interest on the battle-field nearby.

September 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, was the greatest opportunity that ever knocked at the door of an American, the greatest opportunity in our history! Had the possibilities been exhausted Gettysburg and the nearly one year's siege of Petersburg would never have had place in history. Unfortunately the battle was not fought as a unit of aggressive force; practically it was a Corps' Commander and Brigadier General's battle. *McClellan had* 30,000 *men within close supporting distance who did not fire a shot,* but, as usual, were held to cover a possible retreat.

Late on the afternoon of the 19th we left our position and filed into Hagerstown Pike, near Dunker Church, and marched through Sharpsburg on our way to re-capture Maryland Heights; we marched all night and crossed to the East side of the Blue Ridge mountains, about Brownsville, into Pleasant Valley and continued our march therein until we got to the left-front of our fortified line across the crest of Maryland Heights; we then ascended the mountain and not knowing that the rebels had retreated from Harper's Ferry we expected to battle where General Kershaw had attacked the

HARPER'S FERRY—SEPT. 1862. (BRADY SERIES.)
BEFORE LAYING PONTOON BRIDGE—TO RE-TAKE POSSESSION.

CONFLUENCE OF SHENANDOAH RIVER, AND BRIDGE; THE — — — — — —
SHOWS ROAD LINE AROUND END OF THE MOUNTAIN
INTO LOUDOUN VALLEY.

troops of Colonel Miles, but when we arrived at the works we found them abandoned and we bivouacked waiting further orders. All about us was the wreckage of the fighting of September 13th and the unburied bodies of the dead of both armies; to minimize the danger of pestilence the only thing we could do was to gather brush and logs and burn the bodies of the dead. We remained on the summit of Maryland Heights several days. Later we bivouacked—under brush canopies—at the east foot of Maryland Heights in Pleasant Valley, and later marched around the end of the mountain and up on west face of Maryland Heights—where we bivouacked, without shelter, above where the fifty-pounder rifled guns had emplacements.

Blocks and tackle were furnished and we hoisted the abandoned fifty-pounders—which had been spiked and dumped from emplacements—into position and removed the spikes, so as to get the guns in serviceable condition. Later we moved to a bench of the mountain to the right, and a little lower down, where we bivouacked in brush canopies in the brush on the mountain-side. Cold rains came on and as we were poorly clad, and with no shelter, our situation was pitiable—to say the least.

The distance from the battle line at Antietam to the Potomac River was short and Lee had no difficulty in effecting a complete crossing before daylight the morning of the 19th. When our cavalry reached the river rebel batteries had been placed on the bluffs on the Virginia side. General Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, ordered a detachment from

Griffin's and Barnes' brigades, under General Griffin to cross the river at dark the night of September 19th and carry the enemy's batteries. This was gallantly done under the fire of the enemy. Several guns and caissons were taken and their supports driven back half a mile. But information obtained during the progress of this fight, indicated that the main body of the enemy had retreated on the Charlestown and Martinsburg roads towards Winchester; to ascertain how far the enemy had retired General Porter was ordered to detach from his Corps, on the morning of the 20th, a reconnoitering party in greater force; this detachment crossed the river and advanced about a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the enemy lying in ambush in the woods and was driven back across the river with considerable loss. This reconnaisance showed that the enemy was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Potomac and prepared to resist our further advances; General McClellan stated, "Under these circumstances I do not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the South bank, and thereby place that stream—which is liable, at any time, to rise above a fording stage—between my army and its base of supply."

Practically this ended the Maryland Campaign. The work of re-organizing, drilling, and supplying the army, began at the earliest moment; guards were stationed along the river in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. During this period the main army of the enemy remained in the

MARYLAND HEIGHTS TO THE LEFT, LOUDON HEIGHTS—RIGHT DISTANCE.

VIEW-POINT BOLIVAR HEIGHTS—LOOKING DOWN THE POTOMAC RIVER.

vicinity of Martinsburg and Bunker Hill and occupied its time in drafting and enforcing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, taking their property when it was not voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroying railroads.

October 6th, McClellan received an order from Washington to "Cross the river and attack the enemy," but *as usual* dilatory tactics were followed and there was no general movement of the Army of the Potomac until October 26th to November 1st.

On the 25th of October a Pontoon bridge was built at Berlin—there being already one across the Potomac and another across the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry.

On the 26th two divisions of the Ninth Corps and Pleasonton's brigade of cavalry crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. The First, Sixth and Ninth Corps, the cavalry, and the reserve artillery, crossed at Berlin between the 26th of October and the 2nd of November.

The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the 29th of October and the 1st of November. Heavy rains delayed the movement in the beginning; the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were obliged to halt at least one day at the crossings, to complete, as far as possible, necessary supplies that could not be procured at an earlier period.

BRIG. GEN. GEO. G. MEADE.

At the opening of the battle of Antietam, General Mead commanded the 3rd Division 1st Corps. After General Mansfield was killed, and General Hooker wounded, General Williams assumed command of "the right wing" and General Meade the command of the 1st Corps.

In the midst of the Pennsylvania Campaign, in 1863, General Meade was appointed to the command of the Army of the Potomac and until the close of the war was its immediate commander—under General Grant.

General Meade was always equal to the occasion—in strategy and battle.

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